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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Compensable Injuries
In 1958, the long arm of the classic decision in .the Dripps1 case of
1956 continued its influence. In Drt pps a "swing line man" on a boom
had been exerting greater effort to pull his unbalanced boom for nine
weeks. All of a sudden a sharp pain went down his arm. No outside
agency struck him. Compensation was denied.
Four lower courts specifically analyzed the Dripps decision in resolving the issue of what was an "injury" to create compensability. The
Dripps rule required a "physical or traumatic damage or harm accidental
-in character and as a result of external and accidental means in the sense
of being -theresult of a sudden mishap, occurring by chance, unexpectedly
'2
and not in the usual course of events, at a particular time and place.
Compensability was denied to three claimants because of the failure to
meet the Dripps test: a paint spreader who received a back injury when
required to carry paint pots exerting more than usual effort;S a worker
who suffered a sudden back pain and who died three months later from
a subarachnoid hemorrhage after stooping to pick up buckets weighing
20 to 30 pounds; 4 an automobile parker in a garage who turned his head
while parking a car and suffered a subarachnoid hemorrhage.5 However,
one claimant last year -benefited from the Dripps decisions statement
that the Ma!one0 case of 1942 was not being overruled. It will be recalled that Malone had granted death benefits to dependents of a worker
who collapsed from heat exhaustion in the 113' temperature of a foundry
on a hot August day and who died within 12 hours. In the instant case 7
the worker was a "shooter" in a coal mine. He was found dead in a
passageway near the spot where he was discharging explosives on a day
when he and his fellow crewmen were seeking to set a record. There
was a higher concentration of carbon dioxide as a result of the heavier
work load. The "shooter," suffering arterio-sclerosis and cardio vascular
disease, died from a coronary occlusion. His dependents contended his
heart was overtaxed trying to obtain more oxygen from the poisonous
1. Dripps v. Industrial Comm'n, 165 Ohio St. 407, 135 N.E.2d 873 (1956). This

case was discussed in the 1956 Survey, 8 WFST. REs. L REv. 396 (1957).
2.

Dripps v. Industrial Comm'n, 165 Ohio St. 407, 408, 135 N.E.2d 873, 874

(1956).
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Cartwright v. General Motors Corp. 153 N.E.2d 172 (Ohio Ct.App. 1958).
Long v. Industrial Comin'n, 149 N.E.2d 922 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
White v. Industrial Comm'n, 149 N.E.2d 40 (Ohio Cr. App. 1957).
Malone v. Industrial Comm'n, 140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N.E.2d 266 (1942).
Piccherti v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 153 NME.2d 209 (Ohio C. App. 1957).
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atmosphere. The common pleas court at trial had denied this special
request to charge "an injury hiay afis6 through an external iieans, such as
working in fumes and dust and 'being subjected to an event wherein
the air that was breathed was deprived of its ordinary oxygen content and
filled with deleterious gases." To deny this request was prejudicial
error. The court of appeals held that under -the Malone rule this experience was an accident for compensability and the majority decision in
Dripps had not overruled Malone, despite the concurring opinion in
Dripps which so contended.
To reconcile Dripps and Malone is difficult. To effect just administration of the Dripps rule in the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation
procedures in claim decisions is hard. The Workmen's Compensation
Advisory Council, recognizing these problems, adopted in a 4-2 vote a
resolution at its meeting June 26, 1958, which urged legislation to provide
the test of what was an accident in terms similar to Judge Zimmerman's
dissent in the Dripps case: Injury should include any injury received in
the course of and arising out of the injured employee's employment, and
should embrace "injuries accidental in character and result as well as those
produced or caused by accidental means."

Appeals Procedures
The appeals procedures from the Industrial Commission and Bureau
of Workmen's Compensation to the common pleas courts were severely
amended in 1955. Several cases last year clarified these procedures. A
direct appeal to the court after the Regional Board of Review disallowed
a claim was upheld as proper without first appealing to the Industrial
Commission.8 However, a direct appeal to the court from the administrator's decision denying a claim was improper. Only from decisions of
the Industrial Commission or Regional Board of Review can one appeal
to the common pleas courts?
In the 1955 amendments, appeal from Industrial Commission decisions, other than decisions regarding the "extent of disability," to the
common pleas courts was granted.10 This legislative change was remedial
only, not substantive, so its retroactive operation to injuries which had
8. Harrison v. Scanlon, 147 N.E.2d 135 (Ohio C.P. 1958).
9. Moore v. General Motors Corp., 154 N.E.2d 98 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).

10. OHio REV. CODE § 4123.519.
11. Stoich v. Truscon Steel Div. of Republic Steel Corp., 147 N.E.2d 861 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1956); Williams v. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 152 N.E.2d 711
(Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
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occurred before 1955 is not error," even if the application for appeal
was filed prior to the effective date of the 1955 amendments1
The meaning of an Industrial Commission decision on "extent of
disability" was interpreted in one case not to include a Commission's
finding that a generalized arthritic involvement was not the result of injury; hence, an appeal to the common pleas court was in order.' 3 The
petition for appeal which states only the basis for the common pleas
court's jurisdiction is sufficient. Further allegations would be surplusage
so a motion to make definite and certain is out of order.14
Causal Relationship Between Accident and
Physical Condition
The traditional issue of causal relationship between the accident incident and the claimant's physical condition occurred in several cases last
year. Where an employee suffered a severe pre-existing heart disease,
sustained a deep cut in a finger, then died, the medical evidence stated
death -had been accelerated by the accident, but the extent to which death
had been accelerated could not be determined. The Supreme Court held
it would be sheer speculation to find a causal relationship. For death
to be compensable it must be "accelerated by a substantial period of
time."' 6 A jury verdict was upheld, however, where compensability was
deteimined for a worker's death when the man with a pre-existing
coronary sclerosis used extra effort to stack 50 lb. boxes on a five foot
pile and lost his balance which aggravated his heart condition to cause
death.' 6 Another worker, who injured his chest when his tractor fell
over, incurred tuberculosis three years later. Although the disease was
of recent origin, 3 months at most, whether the injury was a direct
cause or not was still held to be a jury issue.17 A similar result was forthcoming when an employee with a nondisabling condition 6f diabetes
mellitus injured his ribs and died six weeks later of coronary sclerosis
and arteriosclerosis.' 8
12.

Frank v. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 152 N.E.2d 708 (Ohio Ct.App.

1956).
13.
14.

Carpenter v. Scanlon, 168 Ohio St. 139, 151 N.E.2d 561 (1958).
Keen v. General Motors Corp. 152 N.E.2d 558 (Ohio C.P. 1958), aff'd on

rehearing 153 N.E.2d 347 (Ohio C.P. 1958).

15. McKee v. The Electric Auto-Lite Co., 168 Ohio St. 77, 151 N.E.2d 540
(1958).
16.
17.
App.
18.

Brickley v. General Electric Co., 150 N.E.2d 457 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
Gatewood v. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 153 N.E.2d 456 (Ohio Ct.
1956).
McGary v. Industrial Comm'n, 104 Ohio App. 149, 147 N.E.2d 274 (1956).
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Jurisdictional Aspects
Jurisdictional issues appeared in 1958 also. To file a petition in
common pleas court more than 60 days after the Industrial Commission
rejected a claim does not meet the jurisdictional requirements of Ohio
Revised Code § 4123.51. This specific workmen's compensation requirement takes precedence over the general provisions of Ohio Revised
Code Sections 2305.03 and 2305.19 which allow the plaintiff one year
if his action is denied for reasons other than on the merits and the
time limit for filing has expired. 19 Also it was not an abuse of discretion for the Industrial Commission to refuse to accept an occupational
disease application filed more than one year after the disability commenced when the statute requires a filing within six months. Mandamus
to force acceptance of the claim would not lie.20
The extent of workmen's compensation coverage challenged Ohio
courts several times. A brewer's truck driver who returned to his employer's taproom to make his daily report argued with another driver's
helper over each other's ability as a beer salesman. A fight ensued, the
argumentative driver was injured and later died. The incident was not
within his employment relationship so his death was not compensable.21
An employer was held not amenable to the Act where he operated a junkyard with two regular employees and occasionaly asked bystanders to
lend a hand to unload trucks without paying them. He was not an employer of three or more which was necessary to come under the Act.22
Grandchildren who received only sporadic financial help from their working grandmother who was killed did not sustain their burden of proving
23
dependency.

The Matter of Proof
Certain matters involving proof either at the administrative or judicial
levels confronted the court. A silicosis compensation claimant refused to
go before the Board of Silicosis referees. X-rays, however, were provided
by the claimant. The Silicosis Board denied the claim. The Board of
Review upheld the claim after hearing other evidence. The Industrial
Commission could not be subjected to mandamus to set aside its award
19. Puttee v. General Motors Corp., 151 N.E.2d 747 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
20. State ex rel. Willis v. Industrial Comm'n, 152 N.E.2d 440 (Ohio Ct. App.
1958).
21. Davis v. Industrial Comm'n, 148 N.E.2d 100 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
22. Hanes v. Ticatch, 104 Ohio App. 523, 150 N.E.2d 493 (1957).
23. Pierson v. Scanlon, 106 Ohio App. 410, 150 N.E.2d 302 (1958).
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to the claimant because he did not personally appear before the Silicosis
24
Board.
Also it was not error to admit as evidence for the jury the Physician's
Certificate in Proof of Death filed with the Industrial Commission by
the employee's doctor. The certificate revealed no history of injury and
showed that the employee's doctor had no opinion concerning the causal
25
relationship -between the accident and death.
In a jury trial at which a special verdict was requested, the jury found
that the plaintiff was injured accidentally, in the course of and arising
out of his employment. A court majority found -theseto be ultimate facts
supporting plaintiff's judgment. The dissent contended that the fact of
accidental injury had not been resolved by this general finding which
was more a statement of law than of fact.20
Prior Recovery Under Another State's Act
An employee of New York was killed on an Ohio highway while
riding as a passenger with a co-employee driver. Both were non-residents
of Ohio and were covered by New York's workmen's compensation laws.
New York provided compensation as the exclusive remedy. The Ohio
Supreme Court, however, permitted a common law tort action by the decedent's widow against the co-employee. Lex loci delicti in Ohio applies
27
despite the New York statutory exclusion of common law actions
Failure of Union To Prosecute Widow's Claim
A widow of a decedent union member sought common law recovery
against the union for failure to prosecute her death claim under workmen's compensation. A union member represented to her that the
union would do so. The court held that the petition failed to allege a
lawful claim (employer amenable, an accidental death, in the scope of
and arising out of employment) and that the union representative was
acting in the scope of the union's employment when he made the promise
to the widow. In the absence of a duty on the union to prosecute the
claim, failure to make these allegations was fatal to the widow's peti28
tion.
OLr-ER SCHROEDER, JR.
24. State ex rel. The Fulton Foundry and Machine Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 153
N.E.2d 711 (Ohio Cr. App. 1957).
25. Huckle v. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 146 N.E.2d 464 (Ohio Ct. App.

1956).
26. Brust v. International Harvester Co., 148 N.E.2d 65 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
27. Ellis v. Garwood, 168 Ohio St. 241, 152 N.E.2d 100 (1958), 10 WEsT. R s.
L. REV. 318 (1959). See also CONFLIcTs and TORTS sections, supra.
28.

Dillow v. Phalen, 153 N.E.2d 687 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
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